Case Analysis Assignment | Homework Help Websites
MLAC Group Division – Page 1
MARITIME LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY: GROUP DIVISION
In February 1991, Kirk McIntyre, Senior Vice President of Maritime Life Assurance Company
and General Manager of the firm’s Group Division, was reviewing the division’s historical performance
and building his agenda for the future. A Summary of Operations report for 1990 had just been released
showing the division achieving exceptional results compared to the previous year, and supporting a
positive trend in divisional performance over nearly a decade.
Though pleased with the results, McIntyre knew there was much to be done. Recession
conditions, anticipated increases in competition, and a variety of internal company concerns were creating
significant pressures for change in divisional strategy, decision-making practices, and the structure of
reward and supervisory systems. Knowing he had to make decisions soon, he thought about the
implications of creating change in various aspects of the firm’s operations and the potential impact of the
changes on performance.
THE CANADIAN INSURANCE INDUSTRY
Insurance is a device for reducing risk to individuals, households, and organizations. It is
provided by firms whose basic expertise lies in combining a sufficient number of exposure units to make
the individual future losses from the units collectively predictable. The operations of these firms entail
setting individual unit premiums at a level that in aggregate covers expected future claims, expenses, and
a reasonable profit. By doing this, insurance firms bring “the magic of averages to the rescue of
millions.”1
Per capita, Canadians in the late 1980s were the third best-insured citizens of the world, after the
Americans and the Japanese. Providing the insurance were approximately 180 life insurance companies
(called underwriters) and 300 property and casualty insurers that collectively held close to $100 billion in
assets and employed 200,000 Canadians. About half the life companies and two thirds of the property and
casualty firms were foreign owned. For life insurance, about 10% of the firms accounted for two thirds of
the revenues; in the property and casualty business, about one third of the firms accounted for 90% of the
premiums.
Firms in the insurance industry were generally conservative and the business was considered
relatively stable. However, significant changes were emerging. As one industry source put it:
“Both arms of the insurance industry are (being) swept up in the sea of change that is under way
in Canada’s financial services sector. Much of the push for the change in Canada has been coming from
1 Winston Churchill cited by Rod McQueen (1985), Risky business: inside Canada’s 86-billion
insurance industry, Toronto: McMillan of Canada
This case was prepared by Ramon Baltazar, Dalhousie University. It is published in the 2003
Proceedings of the Adminstrative Sciences Association in Canada. The case was prepared for purposes of
discussion, and is not intended to demonstrate effective or ineffective management of an administrative
situation. The case may not be reproduced in whole or in part without written permission from the author.
© Ramon Baltazar 2003
MLAC Group Division – Page 2
the United States, where corporate activity has been turbulent. There banks, insurance companies,
brokerage houses, and the rest all seem to have adopted a strategy worthy of Attila the Hun; when in
doubt, invade the other guy’s territory. Giant national retailers like Sears now sell insurance, real estate,
and securities … everything from socks to stocks … Until recently, the Canadian financial services sector
consisted of four separate, staid, and distinct pillars: banks, loan and trust companies, insurance firms, and
securities houses. For the past half-dozen years there has been a blurring at the edges of these four…”2
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
Between the two arms of the insurance industry in Canada, life insurance companies dominated
the market, accounting for about 80% of total industry assets, and approximately $50 billion in industry
revenue. Canadian life companies were among the strongest in the world, even holding 3% of the United
States market even though they were battling against some 1,800 native firms. Measured by the value of
insurance in force, the largest eight Canadian firms in the late 1980s ranked among the top fifty
companies in North America. In a Financial Post ranking by revenue of financial institutions in the
country, Canadian life companies in 1989 occupied four of the top ten spots.
Life companies provide not only life insurance, but also offered health insurance (supplementary
health, dental, vision care, disability) and pension, investment, and administration services. These
companies were normally departmentalized into individual, group, and investment operations. The
investment operation invested the revenue generated by the other divisions. The basis of departmentalization
Between the individual and group divisions was the distribution channel. As the categories imply, the
individual division catered to the needs of single persons and families, while the group division served
business and other organizations. Channels into the individual market were either captive agency
networks or independent brokerage firms that received commissions from the insurance firms for policies
sold. In contrast, channels into the group market were divided among agents, brokers, and consulting
houses. Normally, consulting houses were retained by medium and large firms that paid for the design of
benefit plans and advice in selecting underwriters. Some industry sources believed that clients relied on
the consultants’ advice 90% of the time.
Although some insurance companies had recently brought outsiders into top management posts,
firms in the industry were mostly run by actuaries, professional mathematicians trained in the principles
of large numbers and the theory of probability.
THE GROUP INSURANCE INDUSTRY
Several features distinguished group insurance from individual insurance. First, group members
did not usually pay the full cost of insurance. Employers were generally required by underwriting
regulations to assume part of the premium for group life insurance. Second, employees did not
individually choose their insurance benefit levels. Third, per individual insured, group insurance was less
expensive than individual insurance. The lower expense could be attributed to the following factors: the
absence of individual underwriting; lower distribution costs; employer administration of some of the
program; and tax considerations. Finally, compared to individual insurance, group insurance was a low
margin, high volume business.
2 Benefits Canada (Summer 1990)
MLAC Group Division – Page 3
In the late 1980s, the group insurance industry accounted for over $10 billion in premiums. The
industry was dominated by five players which together accounted for 41% of the market. The group
market could be segmented by employee size. For example, at Maritime Life a firm was considered small
if it employed less than 100 employees, medium if employees numbered between 100-500, and large
otherwise. As a general rule, insurers and their clients were matched by size, i.e., large insurers served
large clients, and so on.
For several decades before the 1980s, the group industry experienced rapid growth. The growth
paralleled the rise of employee benefit plans that over time became so common that the lack of one
adversely affected employee relations. By the end of the 1980s, however, nominal dollar revenue growth
had slowed to about 9% and real growth was barely positive. Economic uncertainty brought about by
forecast recession and the effects of a free trade agreement Canada entered into with the United States
was threatening further declines. As one industry source put it,
“There is a fierce battle in the market, and some clients are changing their underwriters far more
frequently so that they can get the best deals … Plan sponsors (consultants) are shopping around, and
asking for more quotes before tendering business … Companies are trimming their labour forces and there
is more unemployment. It’s very, very competitive.”3
Product development in the industry took the form of meeting the specific needs of particular
market segments while making the most out of existing tax laws. Such new products were easily imitated
and the advantage they created for being first in the market tended to be temporary.
Competitive pressures brought a variety of responses from group insurers. Manulife Financial
sought greater penetration of the large case market through its group field offices. Metropolitan Life
added new products to appeal to the mid sized market while securing its foothold in the large case market.
Aetna Canada targeted small cases and increased its emphasis on providing team-based service to clients.
Many firms, including North American Life, Canada Life, and Mutual Life continued to invest heavily on
hardware and software that would increase the efficiency of operations and/or the firm’s responsiveness to
client needs. Finally, some firms including North American Life, Aetna Life, and Manulife engaged in
various internal programs to enhance the firm’s ability to provide high levels of customer service.
Despite the competition, there was some cooperation between group insurance providers.
Networking in the areas of marketing and education were common, perhaps encouraged by the need by
firms for others to ‘reinsure’ some of their sales. Reinsurance occurred when an insurer that is unable to
assume the full risk of one policy subcontracted part of the business with other insurers.
THE MARITIME LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY
MLAC was founded in 1923 by a group of Nova Scotia families. In 1969, it was purchased by the
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Boston. With Head Office in Halifax, the firm in 1989
employed over 600 individuals and assets totalled $2.2 billion. With $614 million in revenue ($375
million of which was in premiums), the firm was one of the top 20 insurers in the country. Impetus for the
firm’s growth was provided by being the largest supplier of life and health insurance to the Canadian
Armed Forces since the mid 1970s.
3 Benefits Canada (Summer 1990)
MLAC Group Division – Page 4
Growth was fuelled by a series of tradition breaking innovations. A good example was the firm’s
introduction in 1974 of ‘new money policies’ that enabled the policyholder to look over the policy every
few years and change it to suit current needs, income levels, and market conditions. It was just the
opposite of the traditional approach, where a policy was left untouched for years while the agent earned
continuing commissions. Initially, the industry ignored Maritime’s innovation. Eighteen months later, the
industry followed suit.4
Dick Crawford, the firm’s CEO in 1991, had arrived in September 1982 at an uncertain time for
the whole industry. In November 1981, the government budget had put an end to the tax advantage of
some annuities popular with insurance companies. Crawford’s response and first push as CEO was to
introduce new products. Within three months, the firm put in place four new products to replace those that
had been killed by the government budget. By the end of 1983, one half of the firm’s revenue was from
products that had not existed at the start of the previous year.
Crawford departed from what his predecessors had done in two respects. First, his term would be
marked not by a push for rapid growth but by a balance between profits and growth. Second, he would
spread the responsibility, dropping the one person, high profile style his predecessors had adopted.
MLAC GROUP DIVISION
MLAC’s Group Division was established in 1971 mainly in response to the growing needs of the
Canadian Armed Forces. In 1990, the division had a complement of 211 employees and a national 39
person sales force networking with some 500 brokerage houses and consulting firms that sold its
products. Exhibit 1 shows key division statistics for 1986-1990. Total annualized premium income for
1990 was $225 million and operating gain was above $8 million. The Canadian Armed Forces accounted
for about 10% of revenue.
While the country’s top group insurers showed premiums of well over $1 billion in 1990, the
division’s revenue position nevertheless rated within the top 20 in the industry. The division did not
always enjoy this position. Recalled a long time divisional employee:
“In the 1970s, like the rest of the organization we were caught up in growth and consequently
were very sales driven. Unfortunately, we did not know the group business like we did the individual
business. Though we did not do too badly and even did well in the mid 70s, overall performance during
the decade bounced like a yoyo. It was a learning decade for us. But in spite of what we had learned, by
1981 we were still losing money. A large part of the problem was sheer neglect. The divisional head at
the time was heavily involved in pensions, and the corporate people were too caught up in other things,
and so group life and health were pretty much left to run on our own. At the beginning of 1982, the
Division Head vacated the post and we were without one for about a year and a half. Rumour had it that
the people at the top were considering getting out of the group business. You can imagine what morale
was like.”
The change in the division’s performance was accomplished through a balanced concern for
growth and profitability. The division’s business plan document for 1990 deviated little from this dual
4 Rod McQueen (1985), Risky business: inside Canada’s 86-billion insurance industry, Toronto:
McMillan of Canada
MLAC Group Division – Page 5
goal. The plan included being in the top five group insurers by the end of year 2000, as well as the
intention to improve productivity throughout the firm. The division’s growth goal would require a
doubling of income every four years.
According to the business plan, growth was to be achieved through a greater penetration of
existing regional markets and by capturing segments of union business. The profitability goal was to be
achieved primarily by consolidating data base systems and rationalizing procedures. There would be a
continuing emphasis on client service as a competitive emphasis, an area in which the division had
achieved considerable success. As Exhibit 2 shows, MLAC’s Group Division ranked highest when
compared (by an independent consulting company) with competitors on customer service measures.
The division’s structure in 1990 is shown in Exhibit 3. At the core, departmentation was by
function, with most of the division’s products and markets being handled by separate underwriting and
actuarial, marketing and sales, and benefits and administration departments. The exception was the
department in charge of handling SISIP, an acronym for the Canadian Armed Forces account. Strategic
initiatives (mostly new projects) were developed separately until they could be integrated into normal
operations. Corporate Services, a support function, was a recent addition brought into the division when
the pension department was integrated into the corporate investment arm.
The division’s reward system had three components. First was a merit-based component that
depended upon the individual’s job performance. Second was a progress bonus plan that varied around a
targeted three percent (3%) of the individual’s salary, depending upon the whole corporation’s
performance relative to growth and profitability goals. Finally, a Management Incentive Plan was in place
for senior staff and managers. The MIP was an additional bonus provided on the basis of divisional
performance on a composite of profitability, growth, and expense management measures.
KIRK MCINTYRE
In September 1983, Kirk McIntyre was hired into the firm to manage the Group Division. To that
point, the division had never enjoyed a profitable year-end position. Though he was only 31 years of age
when he was hired, he was 6’ 3” tall, solidly built, and had a commanding presence that many in the
Division welcomed.
“We needed a strong presence,” recalled one of the Division’s managers, “and we probably would
have tolerated strong-arm tactics for a while to get us on track. But that was not his style. He was the first
manager I came to know who managed by walking around. Articulate and smart as he obviously was, he
essentially let us do much of the deciding. Or maybe he just wanted us to think that.”
McIntyre had an actuarial background and had worked eight years with Great West Life before
accepting the post. Recalling the early years, he said:
“It was clear from my conversations with Dick (Crawford) prior to accepting the post that I would
be given full rein to run the division subject only to the condition that I improve the profitability of the
business. I took the job for the challenge. Several other things about the company were attractive to me.
Maritime Life had a good reputation. This was especially true in the area of claims administration which
is very important. The management of the company was relatively young and I felt I could fit right in. My
management approach seemed consistent with the culture Dick was trying to develop. My years with
Great West had convinced me that many truly good ideas come from the bowels of the organization and
MLAC Group Division – Page 6
that a good manager should consider enabling those ideas to emerge as a key task. I wanted to test that
belief.
“My plan for the first year was simple – maintain sales, reduce expenses, tackle the problems.
After about two months of getting to know individuals and the specifics of the business, I broached the
subject of cutting expenses at a divisional meeting of managers. I did not talk about survival – though I
felt that at least some of those present thought that was at stake. We discussed how we could cut 10-15%
from our expenses. I asked for volunteers from anywhere in the division to join various task forces
depending on what expense areas they were familiar with. I asked the task forces to come back with
specific expense reduction proposals as well as an indication of what the consequences would be of
undertaking the reductions. Rapid activity in this area went on for about four months. Within a year, we
achieved target, mostly by eliminating the fat the managers found in their own operations.
“I have maintained this style of management. It is very rare that I will actually tell people
specifically what to do. When I have a new idea that I think is worth pursuing, I let people know about it
and leave it to the interested parties to examine it and to bring it back for consultation and if it gets far
enough, for approval.
“At some point early on, I began turning my attention to market and structural issues. Our market
focus at that time consisted of large cases of about 500 employees and up. I had a problem with that
because we were too small to assume the full risk for many of our cases and had to reinsure them with
other companies. I felt it would be better initially to target the under 200 market and compete on the basis
of cost. Later on we realized it was not the best we could do and shifted focus to the 50-500 lives market
with an emphasis on quality service. That is still where we are today.
“The ‘quality service’ component of our strategy revolves around a more responsive claims
administration system than our competitors. The strategy is somewhat controversial, because in practice it
has meant a price premium – two to five percent, on average – over competitor prices. Within our markets
as well as among the consultants we rely on to channel our products into the markets, there is a tendency
to view insurance as a commodity product. Our selling job has often boiled down to demonstrating that
the premium we charge is worth the value in services we provide. Our own people sometimes have
difficulty with the strategy, especially when we lose out to competitors because of price.
“On the organization side, we have undergone many changes. Over the years, I have consolidated
some branch offices, decentralized the underwriting function, and key people have come and gone,
mainly on their own when they could not handle my output expectations. Commissions, incentive
systems, and bonus structures have undergone many refinements. In some cases, the changes were
significant, and were made to accommodate an up swell of concerns or strategy considerations. Only
some months ago we were finally able to adjust the commission structure of our sales representatives to
reflect their role in profitability as well as in new sales and renewals. We wanted to do this much earlier,
but knowing the level of resistance we would encounter, timing was important. In the end of course, it
was a question of finding the appropriate measures and weights. At the present time, we are struggling
with the bonus structure for the whole firm. We had always given bonuses on the basis of corporate and
divisional measures. Now, there is a proposal to take the basis down to the unit level within the divisions.
“Administratively, things are going reasonably well. We have a new building, modern facilities
and up-to-date equipment. Our claims administration continues to be the best in the industry measured by
turnaround time on applications, which is what counts. Our management information systems have
MLAC Group Division – Page 7
improved dramatically in the last several years. Two or three years back, some people had major
problems with the credibility of the numbers that came out of our division, and part of the problem was
that we did not have a single accountant on our staff. Much of the information-reporting task was left to
actuaries who are normally comfortable with estimates, and systems people who are normally efficient at
processing whatever data is given to them. Last year, we hired our first divisional staff with an accounting
background.
“Early on, I institutionalized a yearly planning conference for the head office and field managers
where I have the group formulate business plans and strategies. In addition, there is an annual division
conference to which anyone down to the operational level is invited to contribute to the planning process.
As well, at the end of every quarter, we get together as a division to talk about the results. Twice a year, I
travel to the field, once to talk about the up-and-coming business plan and in the other case, to listen.
“In terms of performance, we lost money in 1983, but made money each year since then. In an
industry where 25-50% of the participating firms typically lose money in any given year, we are happy
with this record. Having said that, we did not do well in 1987 and 1988. There were several reasons. First,
we seemed to have lost the cost consciousness that we had during the early years. Second, we were too
loose in administering long-term disability claims. Third, pensions continued to give us trouble. Over the
last two years we worked on tightening our claims procedures for long-term disability, and the results of
that effort are reflected in last year’s statements.”
PLANNING THE FUTURE
In thinking about the Division’s future, McIntyre’s was drawn to three issues.
First was the question of competitive strategy. The combination of a recession and the prospect of
new industry players such as the banks would result in more intense competition. One of McIntyre’s fears
was that the new competitors would look at group insurance from an entirely different perspective – for
example, by competing aggressively on the industry’s ancillary products without assuming the risks
associated with offering the core products.
Within the division, some felt that industry trends called for a shift in focus from providing
quality service for a premium to being price competitive. Though not ruling anything out, McIntyre
seriously doubted the feasibility of such a move. For a cost based strategy to succeed, the Division would
need to generate a far greater volume of business than it currently had, and compete head to head on price
with the larger competitors. While the division’s 1990 business plan called for such a level of growth,
present circumstances were not conducive to achieving it.
On the other hand, how can the division compete effectively in this environment and continue to
maintain a differentiated stance? A continuing issue for the division was the question of who the client
was. Was it the ultimate user of insurance or was it the consultant? If it were true that ultimate users relied
on the consultant’s advice in selecting underwriters 90% of the time, then a premium pricing strategy
would be difficult, simply because the tendency among consultants had been to drive prices down.
The second issue McIntyre felt needed to be addressed pertained to decision making within the
division. He was bothered by the increasing incidence of what he thought of as “stovepipe decision
making,” where decisions could and should be made at lower levels were instead being floated to the top
to be resolved. The phenomenon jibed with his uneasy observation that bureaucracy, politicking, and for
MLAC Group Division – Page 8
the odd manager, even empire building was slowly taking hold of the process. In McIntyre’s words, all
this was happening “from the middle out.”. In any case, what bothered McIntyre was that increasingly,
decisions were being made a little too late, even where client concerns were involved.
Some argued that McIntyre’s management style – that by now had become institutionalized down
to the lowest levels of the Division – was ultimately to blame for the pace of divisional decision making.
A comment by a manager on this issue was: “People have gone overboard in this participative process.
Driven by the culture, some managers in the division draw from a larger number of people than necessary
to make decisions. Meanwhile, half of the people consulted don’t have a clue of what is going on! What
this has done is to bog down the execution of some really good ideas.” Was it time to take a more
directive approach?
Finally, there was the draft proposal that Crawford had sent out about implementing a change in
the firm’s reward structure. Responding to a groundswell of complaints about the existing reward system,
Crawford proposed two changes. The first was to change the basis of computing an individual’s progress
bonus from a composite measure of profitability and growth to (pre-tax) profits alone. The second change
called for replacing the Management Incentive Plan to a Performance Sharing Plan and of the basis of the
rewards to work unit or departmental, rather than divisional, measures of performance.
In his proposal, Crawford asked plan participants to work together in departmental groups to
create the measures and targets for departmental performance awards. A month of discussions did not
produce the desired results. Instead, they divided the discussants into those who favoured the proposed
system and those who sought to retain the existing system. The former felt that the proposed system tied
the reward to the individual’s performance better than did the existing system. The latter group, however,
felt that there were work units for which fair, objectively measurable indicators were difficult to formulate
and implement without very cumbersome processes, and that the firm’s existing merit plan already
accomplished the intent of the proposed PSP. Aware of the arguments for and against the new plan,
McIntyre wondered how he would respond to Crawford’s memo.
MLAC Group Division – Page 9
Exhibit 1
MARITIME LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY: GROUP DIVISION
Key Statistics for MLAC Group Life and Health
December
1986
December
1987
December
1988
December
1989
December
1990
Number of policies 533 573 565 603 623
Volume of life
insurance
(in $ millions)
12,529 14,338 14,159 13,588 13,202
Key financial statistics
(in $ thousands)
Insured annualized
premium
103,577 111,590 121,174 147,745 183,542
ASO annualized
premium
16,932 23,213 24,155 39,204 42,219
Total premium 120,509 134,803 145,329 186,949 225,761
Loading gain (61) (98) (623) 2,017 (1,492)
Investment gain 2,401 2,325 2,753 4,544 3,959
Underwriting gain 1,364 (12) (1,274) (5,386) 2,703
Normal operating
gain
3,704 2,215 856 1,175 5,170
Investment on
surplus
2,030 2,128 2,183 1,561 1,534
Extraordinary items (428) (173) 2,283 0 1,576
Final operating
gain
5,306 4,170 5,322 2,736 8,280
SOURCE: MLAC Group Finance and Actuarial Department records
Insurance accounting practices and terminology are very specific to the industry. A note on analysis of
gain by source is provided on the following page.
Final operating gain figures (in $thousands) for 1983, 1984, and 1985 are $4,071, $1,679, and $1,378,
respectively.
MLAC Group Division – Page 10
Exhibit 1 (continued)
MARITIME LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY: GROUP DIVISION
Note on Analysis of Gain by Source
The most important aspect of group insurance financial reports is the bottom line, the overall gain
or loss for the quarter or the year. It is the figure by which divisional activities are judged. On a long-term
basis, a profit to the firm’s owners must be returned to justify continuing operations. The results affect
business decisions, new initiatives, and bonuses.
In analyzing the results, it helps to break things down and examine the components to identify
problem and success areas. One of the more important financial reports produced is the Analysis of Gain
by Source (AGBS). The AGBS splits the overall results into three components – underwriting,
investment, and loading. It is prepared for the entire block of business on a refund and non-refund basis.
The loading gain is the difference between the portion of premium allocated to cover expenses
(retention), and actual expenses. Although theoretically, retention should cover all expenses, this is rarely
the case. As a result, a loading loss is usually reflected in budgets.
The investment gain is the difference between investment income earned on reserves and required
interest. Required interest is the interest needed to meet the assumptions used in the reserve calculations.
Reserve interest rates are very conservative. As a result, positive investment gains are typical.
The underwriting gain is based on the difference between expected claims and actual claims. If
the two match, then a positive underwriting gain is obtained. Underwriting results tend to vary widely as
claims are unpredictable, particularly for some coverages such as LTD.
Adding the three components together results in the total operating gain for the quarter or year.
This can be shown as: Loading Gain + Investment Gain + Underwriting Gain = TOTAL OPERATING
GAIN.
SOURCE: MLAC Group Finance and Actuarial Department records
MLAC Group Division – Page 11
Exhibit 2
MARITIME LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY: GROUP DIVISION
Excerpts from MLAC Group’s Promotions Material
“Brendan Wood, Tutsch (BWT), one of the most prominent market research firms in the financial
services industry, has been conducting a continuing series of surveys about the Canadian Group Insurance
Marketplace. In 1990 they conducted the third installment of this series, which included both Consultant
and Plan Sponsor views of insurance carriers…
“In the survey, Consultants and Plan Sponsors agreed that fast, accurate claims service was
definitely one of the most important components of ‘good service.’ Plan sponsors rated their satisfaction
with the speed, accuracy and fairness of claims service. BWT says ‘…Maritime Life is the one company
whose ratings stand ahead of the rest. In total, 96% of Maritime’s clients give high ratings for claims
service…’
“The BWT survey also looked at two components of customer service: speed and ease of problem
resolution. Maritime Life ranked highest of all companies, with 84% of customers satisfied…When we
read that the BWT survey found that 41% of Plan Sponsors made Life/Health carrier changes or additons
in the past two years, we began to realize that our result of 82% of clients being with us more than two
years was unusual…
“Plan Sponsors were asked to rate the quality of service they received from their insurer along 13
performance dimensions. BWT presented findings for five main areas of service: Product, Pricing,
Claims, Customer and Other Services…In their report, BWT says: ‘Maritime is the leader in overall
service delivery with 88% of clients rating their performance as outstanding.’”
SOURCE: MLAC Marketing Department records
MLAC Group Division – Page 12
Exhibit 3
MARITIME LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY: GROUP DIVISION
MLAC Group Division’s Partial Organization Structure in 1990
SOURCE: MLAC internal company records
Senior Vice-President,
Group Division
Vice-President, Corporate
Services
Manager, Strategic
Initiatives
Manager,
SISIP Services
Director, Group Finance,
Actuarial, and Underwriting
Vice-President, Marketing
and Sales
Director, Group Benefits
and Administration
Montreal sales office staff
Halifax sales office staff
Marketing staff
Toronto underwriting staff
Halifax underwriting staff
Finance and Actuarial
department staff
Rehabilitation services staff
Group Insurance
Administration staff
Edmonton sales office staff
Toronto sales office staff
Vancouver claims office
staff
Toronto claims office staff
Montreal claims office staff
Halifax claims office staff
Vancouver sales office staff